



Annual Safety Statistics Report 2025

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1. About us

We are the International Marine Contractors Association, the voice of the offshore construction industry worldwide.

IMCA is a global trade association with more than 850 Member companies in 65 countries. We represent marine contractors, energy companies, national regulators, and the supply chain that supports the offshore construction sector.

Our mission is to champion, protect, and support the offshore construction industry and its workforce, so that it is safe, sustainable, and fit for the future.

We do this by advocating for technical excellence and standardisation, championing a safe, skilled and diverse workforce, and supporting sustainability and operational efficiency.

IMCA works with its Members to develop technical guidance, competence frameworks, safety learning, and performance data that support safer and more effective marine operations. Many IMCA outputs are used by energy companies, contractors, and regulators as recognised good practice across the marine contracting industry.

Safety has been central to IMCA's work since its formation in 1995. This report is one part of that work. It helps the industry understand reported safety performance, identify common risks, and focus collective effort where it can make the greatest difference.



2. Executive statement

Safety sits at the heart of IMCA's purpose.

Our Members work in complex, high-risk environments, often in difficult conditions and across a changing offshore energy landscape. The people who do that work have the right to expect that safety remains central to every decision, every operation, and every improvement we make as an industry.

This year's safety statistics show why that focus matters.

There are areas of progress. The reported lost time injury frequency rate and total recordable injury rate both improved in 2025. This reflects the continued effort of our Members and their workforces, and it should be recognised.

But we cannot look at those improvements in isolation. IMCA Members reported seven fatalities in 2025, including four offshore. Behind each number is a person, a family, colleagues, and a company affected by loss. That must give all of us pause.

It also reinforces a simple point: lower injury rates do not automatically mean that the risks of fatal or life-changing harm are under control.

The value of this report is not just in the figures, but in what we do with them.

IMCA will use the 2025 data to support a sharper focus on serious injury and fatality prevention, line-of-fire risk, high-consequence hazards, and the quality of learning across the sector. We will also continue to work with Members to improve participation and strengthen the usefulness of the data itself.

I am grateful to every Member that contributed to this year's report. Sharing safety data is an act of trust and leadership. It helps the industry see where progress is being made, where risk remains, and where collective action is needed. I would like to see even more contractor Members take part in future years, because the stronger the dataset, the stronger the insight.

IMCA's role is to help turn that insight into practical action. Through our committees, workgroups, guidance, Safety Flashes, and events, we will continue to support Members in reducing harm and improving safety performance across the marine contracting industry.

The goal remains clear. Everyone working in our sector should go home safe and well.



Iain Grainger
CEO

3. Welcome & how to use this report



Mark Holmes,
Safety and Security
Manager

IMCA has produced an annual report of safety statistics supplied by contractor Members every year since 1997. Over that time, the report has become an important benchmark for the offshore marine contracting industry.

This report provides an overview of contractor Members' safety data for 2025. It is intended to help Members understand reported performance across the sector, compare their own results with companies of a similar size, and identify areas where further attention may be needed.

For the second year in a row, the report is based on more than one billion hours of work. In 2025, 167 contractor Members submitted safety data, reporting 1.02 billion hours worked. That gives IMCA a substantial evidence base and helps guide the work of our committees, workgroups, and safety communications.



Nicholas Hough
Safety and Security
Consultant

This report should be read as the main safety data publication for 2025. [A supporting slide deck is also available.](#) The slide deck contains the wider graph pack and additional charts, but the main interpretation and IMCA response are set out here.

As with any industry dataset, the figures should be read with care. The data is based on information submitted by contractor Members and reflects the scope, definitions, and reporting maturity of those companies. It helps us see patterns and trends, but it does not explain everything on its own.

For 2025, the picture is mixed. Total lost time injury frequency and total recordable injury rates improved. That is encouraging. But Members also reported seven fatalities, four of which were offshore. Safety observation reporting fell significantly. These findings need proper discussion and follow-up.

This is why the report should be seen as more than a set of statistics. It is a starting point for learning. It helps IMCA and its Members ask where serious harm can occur, where controls need to be strengthened, and where shared learning can make a practical difference.

We would like to thank every Member that contributed data for 2025. We would also like to see broader participation in future years. A fuller dataset gives Members a stronger benchmark and helps IMCA focus its work where it can add most value.

If you have any questions about this report, or would like to contribute to next year's safety statistics, please contact the Health, Safety, and Security Team, or visit the safety statistics area of the IMCA website.

Thank you, and stay safe.

4. 2025 in brief



167 Contractor Members

contributed safety data



1.02 billion hours

of work were reported



Seven fatalities

reported, of which four were offshore.



0.69 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)

increase from 0.30 in 2024



268 Lost Time Injuries (LTIs) reported



996 Total Recordable Injuries (TRIs)

reported



Line of fire is the most common LTI



Safety Observation Frequency Rate (SOFR)

of 387.1, a decrease from 482.1 in 2024

LTIFR

Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate
(Fatalities + LTIs) x 1,000,000 / total hours worked

0.27

in 2025

0.30

compared to 2024

TRIR

Total Recordable Injury Rate (Fatalities + LTIs + Restricted Work Cases + Medical Treatment cases) x 1,000,000 / total hours

0.30

in 2025

0.35

compared to 2024

TRIR (offshore)

1.14

in 2025

1.38

compared to 2024

5. Key messages from the 2025 data

5.1. The dataset is substantial, but participation still matters

The 2025 report is based on 1.02 billion hours worked. This gives IMCA a strong evidence base. But the benchmark becomes more useful as more contractor Members contribute. Better participation helps Members compare performance more fairly. It also helps IMCA identify the risks and themes that deserve collective attention.

5.2. Injury rates improved

Total LTIFR reduced from 0.30 in 2024 to 0.27 in 2025. Total TRIR reduced from 1.10 in 2024 to 0.98 in 2025. This is positive and should be recognised. But these indicators do not tell the full story.

5.3. Fatalities increased

Seven fatalities were reported in 2025, including four offshore fatalities.

Reported fatal incidents included electrocution, a fall from height, and a mooring incident involving a parted rope. Further information about four additional fatalities, reported by two contractors, has not been provided. This reinforces the need to look beyond headline injury rates and focus more directly on serious injury and fatality prevention.

5.4. Line of fire remains the leading cause of LTIs

Line of fire remained the most common cause of LTIs in 2025. This is a broad category. To be useful, it needs to be broken down into the work situations where people are exposed to harmful energy. These include lifting and rigging, mooring, moving equipment, dropped objects, stored energy, suspended loads, and tasks where hands or body parts are placed in hazardous positions.

5.5. Safety observation reporting fell significantly

SOFR fell from 482.1 to 387.1 observations per 200,000 hours worked. That is a reduction of around 20%.

The reason is not yet clear. It may reflect fewer observations being carried out. It may reflect changes in reporting systems or definitions. It may reflect changes in the companies submitting data. It may also reflect a shift in how Members use observation programmes.

5.6. The “so what” matters

The report should not end with the numbers. The 2025 data will be used to shape IMCA’s work on serious injury and fatality prevention, line-of-fire risk, high-consequence hazards, safety observations, data quality, and stronger links between Safety Flashes, guidance, and Member action.

6. What the data means for IMCA

The 2025 data should not be read as a straightforward story of success or failure. It is more nuanced than that.

The reduction in LTIFR and TRIR shows continued progress in reported injury performance. But the fatality picture shows that the risk of serious harm remains present in offshore marine contracting. The fall in safety observations also raises questions about reporting culture and the visibility of weak signals.

For IMCA, the “so what” from the data should be practical and focused.

6.1. Serious injury and fatality prevention

IMCA will continue to develop its focus on serious injury and fatality prevention. This should include discussion with Members on how serious harm potential is identified, how learning is shared, and how fatal and life-changing risks are controlled.

This work should be aligned where practical with existing industry approaches, including work on fatalities and permanent impairment, serious injury and fatality potential, high-potential incidents, and critical controls. The aim is to avoid creating another abstract metric that adds complexity without improving safety. The value lies in better recognition of serious harm potential and stronger action where risk is high.

6.2. Line of fire and high-energy work

Line of fire remains the leading cause of LTIs. It also cuts across several serious harm areas, including lifting, mooring, dropped objects, moving equipment, stored energy, and work around suspended loads. The next step is to move from broad labels to more specific work situations and control checks. This should help Members better understand where line-of-fire risk is arising and what practical controls are most important.

6.3. Safety observations and learning from normal work

The fall in SOFR needs further review. IMCA will first seek to understand whether the reduction is driven by reporting behaviour, changes in participating companies, data quality, or genuine operational change.

The broader question is whether safety observations are being used to support learning from normal work. IMCA will encourage Members to focus on quality, action, and feedback, not simply the number of cards submitted.

This may also support future discussion on whether IMCA's data collection should include additional information on serious harm potential, critical controls, or high-potential events. Any change would need careful discussion with Members and clear definitions.

6.4. Data quality and participation

The strength of the IMCA benchmark depends on participation and data quality. IMCA will encourage broader contractor Member participation in the annual data process and continue work on definitions, reporting clarity and meaningful benchmarking.

7. About the data

7.1 Scope

This report is based on safety data submitted by IMCA contractor Members for the 2025 reporting year. The data covers total company hours and offshore hours. Offshore hours are calculated on a 12-hour basis.

7.2 Definitions

Total company hours - Hours worked by employees across the entire organisation, including overtime.

Offshore hours - Hours worked on vessels, barges, boats, or any other offshore structures or installations, based on a 12-hour day.

Fatalities - The number of employees and others who died as a result of an incident. This excludes fatalities occurring as a result of illness or ill-health that occurred at the worksite, such as fatal heart disease.

Fatal accident rate (FAR) - The number of fatalities per 100 million hours worked.

Lost time injuries (LTIs) - The number of work-related injuries which caused the injured person to be absent from work for at least one normal shift after the event because of unfitness to perform any duties.

Lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) - The number of LTIs, including fatalities, per million hours worked.

Total recordable Injuries (TRIs) - The number of recordable injuries, including fatalities, LTIs, restricted work cases and medical treatment cases.

Total recordable injury rate (TRIR) - The number of TRIs, per million hours worked.

Safety observations (SOs) - The number of recorded positive and negative safety or hazard observations, identifying both unsafe behaviours, conditions or situations, and positive safety observations.

Safety observation frequency rate (SOFR) - The number of safety observations per 200,000 hours worked.

7.3 Data quality and limitations

IMCA relies on Members submitting accurate and complete data. Submissions are reviewed for irregularities, and significant differences from previous years may be checked with the submitting Member before publication.

The data should still be interpreted with care. Differences in company scope, operating profile, reporting systems, definitions, internal reporting culture, and maturity can affect comparisons. Smaller datasets are also more volatile, meaning that a small number of incidents can have a large effect on frequency rates.

This does not reduce the value of the dataset. It does mean the data should be used to support better questions and better decisions, not treated as a simple league table. Full data tables for total, offshore, and company banded breakdowns can be found in Appendix A, B, and C.

As part of IMCA's ongoing data quality assurance, historic records have been reviewed and cleaned during the transition from legacy reporting systems to the current safety statistics database. This may result in differences compared with figures published in previous years, but does not change the overall trends or conclusions.

7.4 Participation

A total of 167 contractor Members submitted data for 2025, reporting 1.02 billion hours of work. See Appendix D for the list of companies that contributed.

This is the second year in a row that IMCA's safety statistics have been based on more than one billion hours worked. This is a significant achievement. It gives IMCA and its Members a strong basis for benchmarking and trend analysis.

But participation remains an area for improvement. IMCA has more contractor Members than those who submitted data in 2025. A fuller dataset would improve the benchmark and give the industry better insight into where safety effort should be focused.

IMCA will continue to encourage broader participation by:

- making the value of participation clearer to Members,
- simplifying the submission process where possible,
- continuing to improve definitions and guidance,
- showing how the data is used to shape IMCA's work,
- using the Health and Safety Committee to test and improve the annual process.



8. Fatalities

IMCA Members reported seven fatalities in 2025. Four occurred offshore. Reported fatal incidents included:


- a fatal electrocution,
- a fatal fall from height,
- a fatal mooring incident involving a parted rope.

Further information about the additional four fatalities, reported by two contractors, has not been provided.

Table 1. Fatalities for past five years

Year	Fatalities	Offshore	Onshore	FAR	Cause
2025	7	4	3	0.69	Electrocution (1) Fall from height (1) Mooring incident involving a parted rope (1) No information provided (4)
2024	3	2	1	0.30	Line of fire fatality (1) Injured at a rig site (1) Crushed when a trench collapsed (1)
2023	6	2	4	0.63	Fall from height (2) Overboard in rough weather (1) Line of fire (dropped object) (1) A fatality at a partner company (1) No information provided (1)
2022	6	2	2	0.9	Pilot boat which sank with loss of life (2) Working at height (1) Drowning after a crane collapsed in a yard (1) No information provided (2)
2021	16	15	-	2.86	Capsize of a liftboat, Gulf of Mexico (9) Vessel fire, Bombay High (4) Drowning, Bombay High (1) Fell overboard crossing between vessels, Nigeria (1) No information provided (1)

Graph 1. Recorded total and offshore fatalities and fatal accident rate (FAR) 2005-2025.



The increase in fatalities is a serious concern. This is why IMCA will use the 2025 data, together with Member input and Safety Flash learning, to support a stronger focus on preventing serious injuries and fatalities.

The focus should be practical. It should include:

- how serious harm potential is identified,
- how high-potential incidents are classified,
- how critical controls are defined and checked,
- how learning is shared without discouraging reporting,
- how IMCA can align with existing industry approaches where this helps Members.


There is already discussion across the industry on concepts such as ‘fatality and permanent impairment’, ‘serious injury and fatality potential’, ‘serious injury frequency’ and ‘high-potential incidents’. IMCA should not create additional complexity unless it helps Members act. The aim is better learning and stronger controls, not another metric for its own sake.

Where fatal incidents are reported without enough detail to support wider learning, IMCA will continue to encourage Members to share information in a way that protects confidentiality while still allowing the industry to learn.

9. Injury performance


The total LTIFR improved to 0.27 injuries per million hours worked (268 reported lost time injuries in 2025), compared with 0.30 in 2024. Offshore LTIFR was 0.30.

Graph 2. Total lost time injuries and LTIFR 2005-2025



The total recordable injury rate also improved, falling to 0.98 recordable injuries per million hours worked, compared with 1.10 in 2024. Offshore TRIR was 1.14.

Graph 3. Total recordable injuries and TRIR 2005-2025



The improvement in LTIFR and TRIR is encouraging. It suggests continued progress in reducing reported injury rates across the participating contractor Member dataset. But this needs to be interpreted alongside the fatality data.


The industry should not assume that fewer recordable injuries automatically means the risk of serious harm is falling. LTIFR and TRIR remain useful benchmarking indicators, but they do not always show where fatal or life-changing harm could occur.

That is why the 2025 report gives more attention to serious harm potential, line-of-fire risk, high-consequence activities, and safety observation quality.


9.1 Main causes of LTIs

Line of fire remained the most common cause of LTIs in 2025.

Graph 4. LTI type in 2024



Graph 5. LTI type in 2025



The proportion of LTIs caused by line-of-fire incidents (41%) appears to have fallen compared with 2024 (52%). This may reflect the significant effort made by Members to address line-of-fire exposures and a general downward trend in the severity of LTIs, suggested by the increased proportion of slips, trips, and falls (34% in 2025), and muscular injuries (10%), the second and third highest proportion of LTIs.

It should be noted that slips, trips, and falls, and muscular injuries may appear lower consequence than some other events, but they still cause harm and disruption. They can also point to wider issues in planning, worksite conditions, housekeeping, ergonomics, fatigue, task design, or supervision. But line of fire remains the leading reported cause of LTIs. It is also closely linked to serious injury and fatality potential.

Line of fire is a broad category. It can include many different work situations, such as:

- lifting and rigging,
- mooring and snap-back zones,
- dropped objects,
- moving equipment,
- suspended loads,
- stored energy,
- pressure release,
- simultaneous operations,
- hand and finger exposures,
- people placing themselves in the path of harmful energy.

Therefore it can hide useful detail. “Line of fire” tells us the general type of exposure. It does not always tell us enough about the work being done, the control that failed, or the decision that needs to change.

For IMCA, the next step is to break the theme down into practical work contexts and control checks.

10. Critical risk themes

The 2025 data, Safety Flash learning and Member feedback point to a small number of recurring critical risk themes. These themes are not new, and that is partly the point here. The industry continues to see harm and serious potential from familiar activities.

Line of fire and harmful energy

Line of fire remains the leading LTI cause and a recurring serious harm concern. The key issue is not only awareness, but whether work is planned and controlled so people are not placed in the path of harmful energy.

This includes hands-free working, exclusion zones, tag line use, lifting control, equipment design, communication, supervision, and stop-work confidence.

Lifting, rigging, and suspended loads

Lifting and rigging continue to feature strongly in Member feedback and serious harm discussions.

The risks are not limited to complex engineered lifts. Routine lifts, smaller lifts, container handling, deck operations, and interactions with third-party equipment can all create serious exposure if planning, competence or supervision is weak.

Dropped objects

Dropped objects remain a recurring concern across offshore operations. They are linked to lifting, work at height, equipment condition, secondary retention, housekeeping, and dropped object inspections. They also have clear serious injury and fatality potential.

Mooring and snap-back

The fatal mooring incident in 2025 reinforces the need to keep mooring risk visible. Snap-back, rope condition, line handling, exclusion zones, communication, and competence remain critical.

Working at height

The fatal fall from height reported in 2025 reinforces the need for continued attention on working at height controls, including planning, equipment, anchor points, rescue arrangements, supervision, and competence.

Electrical safety

The fatal electrocution reported in 2025 points to the need to maintain focus on isolation, competence, testing, equipment condition, stored energy, and control of work.


Routine work

Several Member discussions have highlighted concern about routine tasks. Incidents are not only happening during major or unusual operations. They can arise during stairs, ladders, small lifts, container moves, toolbox talk failures, poor task-specific competence, weak supervision, or missed management of change. Routine work still needs active risk management.

11. Safety observations

The SOFR, measured across total hours worked, fell from 482.1 per 200,000 hours worked in 2024 to 387.1 per 200,000 hours worked in 2025. This is a reduction of around 20%.

Graph 6. Safety observation and rate 2005-2025



The reason for the fall is not yet clear. It may be that there was simply fewer safety observations being carried out. It may be due to changes in the companies submitting data. It may reflect changes in internal reporting systems, observation definitions, reporting behaviour, data quality, or the way Members are using observation programmes.

IMCA should avoid drawing a firm conclusion until the data has been reviewed further. However, the change is large enough to be treated as a signal.

Safety observations are often used as an indicator of reporting culture, engagement, and workforce participation. They can help companies identify weak signals before harm occurs. But only if they are meaningful.

Counting observations without understanding their quality, follow-up, or learning value can give false comfort.

A high number of observations does not automatically mean risk is being managed well. A lower number does not automatically mean reporting culture has weakened.


The question is what the observations are telling us and whether they lead to better conversations, better decisions and better controls.

Several Members have also raised wider concerns about reporting maturity, definitions, near-miss reporting, hazard card reporting, and the practical value of observation programmes.

The aim is not to push Members to generate more safety observations for the sake of it. The aim is to encourage useful reporting, better conversations about work, and stronger learning from the conditions that could lead to harm. Observations should be useful. They should help people understand work as it is really done, identify weak signals, and close the loop through feedback and action.

11.1 Observations and recordables

IMCA has historically tracked SOFR alongside TRIR. The relationship between the two is not simple.



We have reported a reduction in the rate of safety observations in 2025 from an all-time high in 2024. This is reflected in a downtick in the rolling five-year average of SOFR, which provides a smoothed out trend over the past 20 years, where we had seen a continuous increase in SOFR vs a continued, but increasingly flattened trend in TRIR.

Higher observation rates do not automatically produce lower recordable injury rates. Lower observation rates do not automatically mean that recordable injuries will rise. Safety observation reporting is still useful, but it should be treated as one part of the wider picture.


The fall in SOFR in 2025 should be explored alongside other indicators, including:

- injury trends,
- fatalities,
- high-potential events,
- Safety Flash themes,
- Member feedback,
- near-miss reporting,
- quality of close-out actions,
- frontline engagement,
- evidence of control effectiveness.

This is also linked to the wider discussion about what IMCA should collect in future. Safety observations continue to have value. But they may need to be better understood, better defined, or supplemented by other information that tells us more about serious harm potential and control effectiveness.

12. Company banding

IMCA categorises contributing Members into four bands according to the number of hours they report. This allows peer-group comparison and helps companies benchmark against organisations of a similar size.



Banding remains useful because company size can have a significant effect on injury frequency rates. Smaller datasets are more sensitive to individual incidents, while larger companies tend to produce more stable year-on-year results.

However, size is only one factor. Risk profile, operating region, contract type, work scope, reporting maturity, and the balance between offshore and onshore activity can all affect reported rates.

For that reason, banding should be used as a guide. It helps start the benchmarking conversation. It does not replace the need for companies to understand their own risk profile and the effectiveness of their own controls.

12.1 Total LTIFR and TRIR by Company band

The 2025 banding data continues to show a clear pattern with smaller company bands generally reporting higher LTIFR and TRIR than larger company bands. The dataset can be seen Appendix C.

Table 2. LTIFR and TRIR per company band


Company band	No. of companies	Total		Offshore	
		LTIFR	TRIR	LTIFR	TRIR
Band A (>10 million hours worked)	23	0.19	0.76	0.24	0.90
Band B (5-10 million hours worked)	17	0.34	1.36	0.26	1.45
Band C (1-5 million hours worked)	45	0.55	1.69	0.45	1.37
Band D (<1 million hours worked)	82	0.88	2.32	0.81	2.37
IMCA total	167	0.27	0.98	0.30	1.14

This does not mean smaller companies are necessarily less safe. However, the pattern does reinforce an important point for IMCA. Guidance, learning, and safety communications need to be practical and accessible for Members of different sizes and resource levels. A report that only works for large companies will not serve the whole membership.

13. Comparison with other associations

IMCA continues to compare selected injury rates with other peer associations across the marine and energy sectors.

Graph 9. TRIR comparison with other associations 2010-2025



These comparisons are useful, but they should be interpreted with care. Different associations may use different scopes, definitions, industry segments, and have different reporting cultures.

The value of comparison is not to rank sectors. It is to help Members understand broad patterns, ask better questions, and identify where common learning may exist.

IMCA will continue to work with other industry bodies where there is shared interest in improving safety performance, strengthening definitions, and reducing unnecessary duplication for contractors working across multiple sectors.

This is particularly important where Members work across offshore oil and gas, offshore wind, marine construction, diving, survey, lifting, ROV, and other related sectors. Different requirements, definitions, and reporting expectations can create unnecessary complexity for contractors.

14. What Members can do with this report

This report is intended to support discussion and action inside Member companies. Members may wish to use it to ask the following questions.

14.1 For senior leaders

- Are we looking beyond LTIFR and TRIR when discussing safety performance?
- Do we understand where fatal and life-changing harm could occur in our operations?
- Are critical controls for high-consequence work visible, understood, and checked?
- Are we learning from high-potential events, not just recordable injuries?
- Are we contributing data to IMCA, and are we using the benchmark properly?

14.2 For HSE leaders

- How do our trends compare with the IMCA dataset?
- Are our safety observations useful, or mainly a volume measure?
- Do we have clear definitions for high-potential incidents, SIF potential, or FPI?
- Are our Safety Flashes and alerts leading to action?
- Are we feeding learning back to the workforce?

14.3 For project and vessel teams

- Where are people exposed to line-of-fire risk?
- What tasks put people near moving loads, stored energy, snap-back zones, or suspended equipment?
- Are routine tasks still being properly planned and supervised?
- Are toolbox talks and risk assessments specific to the work being done?
- Do people receive feedback when they raise observations or concerns?

14.4 For clients and contractors working together

- Are contract requirements helping or adding confusion?
- Are client and contractor expectations aligned on critical controls?
- Are lessons shared across interfaces, not only within individual companies?
- Are offshore wind, oil and gas, marine and construction requirements being aligned where possible?

15. Closing message

The 2025 safety data shows progress, but it also shows where the industry must keep its focus.

Lower injury rates are welcome. But seven fatalities cannot be treated as background noise. They are a reminder that serious harm prevention must remain central to IMCA's safety work.

The next step is to use the data well. That means asking harder questions, focusing on the risks that can kill or permanently harm people, and helping Members learn from each other in a way that is practical and usable.

IMCA will continue to work with its Members, Committees, and partner organisations to improve safety performance across the marine contracting industry.

The goal remains clear. Everyone working in our sector should go home safe and well.



16. Frequently asked questions

Q - Does the data include all IMCA Members?

A - No. IMCA collects data from contractor Members only.

We categorise contributing Members into four bands according to the number of hours worked. This allows peer-group comparison and benchmarking between companies of a similar size.

Q - How accurate are the statistics?

A - IMCA relies on Members submitting accurate and complete data. Submissions are reviewed against previous years where possible, and significant irregularities may be checked with the submitting Member before publication.

The data should still be interpreted with care. Differences in reporting systems, definitions, operational scope and reporting maturity can affect year-on-year comparisons.

Q - What definitions are used for the analysis?

A - The main definitions are included near the start of this report. IMCA uses internationally recognised definitions to calculate LTIFR and TRIR.

Medical treatment (beyond first aid) involves significant work-related injuries or illnesses that are diagnosed by a physician or other licensed health care professional. IMCA uses the OSHA (United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration) definition of medical treatment, which is the management and care of a patient to combat a disease or disorder. OSHA's definition of medical treatment does not include visits to a doctor or other licensed health care professional solely for observation, counselling, diagnostic procedures or first aid. Restricted workday case (RWC) is any work-related injury other than a fatality or lost workday case which results in a person being unfit for full performance of a regular job on the shift/day after the injury.

Q - Why does IMCA still report LTIFR and TRIR?

A - LTIFR and TRIR remain widely used across industry and are useful for benchmarking. However, they should not be treated as the only measures of safety performance. They do not always show where fatal or life-changing harm could occur.

That is why IMCA is also focusing on serious injury and fatality prevention, high-consequence hazards, safety observations, Safety Flash learning, and the practical controls needed to prevent serious harm.

Q - What is IMCA doing about the most common causes of LTIs?

A - Line of fire remains the most common cause of LTIs. IMCA will continue to treat it as a priority area, while breaking the broad category down into more specific work contexts such as lifting and rigging, mooring, dropped objects, moving equipment, stored energy and suspended loads.

This work will be taken forward through the Health & Safety Committee, Safety Flashes, guidance, workgroups, events and targeted safety communications.

Q - Why did safety observation reporting fall?

A - The reason is not yet clear. SOFR fell from 489.8 to 387.1 observations per 200,000 hours worked. This may reflect fewer observations being carried out, changes in the group of companies submitting data, changes in internal reporting systems, or differences in reporting quality.

IMCA will discuss this with the Health and Safety Committee and consider whether further analysis or communication is needed.

Q - Are more safety observations always better?

A - Not necessarily. Safety observations are useful when they help identify weak signals, support better conversations about work, and lead to meaningful action.

A high number of observations does not automatically mean a strong safety culture. A lower number does not automatically mean a weak one. The quality of the observation, the follow-up, and the feedback to the workforce matter.

Q - What initiatives is IMCA putting forward to mitigate the most common cause of LTIs?

A - IMCA committees made up of representatives from Member companies form working groups to collaborate on initiatives to raise standards in the marine contracting industry. Our outputs include information and guidance notes, training apps, videos, as well as our engagement with clients, governments, and regulators. Recent examples include IMCA guidance on 'walk to work' activities and a collaboration with other industry working groups to reduce enclosed space fatalities.

Q - Will IMCA collect Serious Injury and Fatality (SIF) or Fatal and Permanent Impairment (FPI) data in future?

A - This remains under discussion. There is interest in serious injury and fatality potential, fatalities and permanent impairment, and high-potential incidents. There is also a need for clear definitions and careful implementation.

IMCA will continue to discuss this with Members before making any significant changes to the annual data collection process.

Q - Are there regional differences in the statistics?

A - IMCA Members operate in an increasingly globalised industry. While there may be regional differences in incident rates, it has not proven practical to collect consistent information on the geographical location of Members' actual operations for this report.

Q - How does IMCA compare with other associations?

A - IMCA compares selected injury rates with peer associations where useful and where comparable data is available. These comparisons should be treated with care because industry scope, reporting definitions, and operating environments can differ.

The purpose is not to rank associations or sectors, but to support learning and identify common areas for improvement.

Q - What can we learn from peer associations?


A - IMCA works closely with other trade associations to ensure that the most up-to-date practices are followed with regard to incident reporting and data collection. This includes close collaboration with the G+ and membership of the IOGP's Safety Data subcommittee.

Q - Where can Members see previous safety statistics?

A - Previous IMCA safety statistics reports are available on the IMCA website and can be downloaded by Members and non-members.

**You can find
additional
information online
by clicking here**

Main causes of LTIs in 2025



17. Appendix

A. IMCA safety data 2005 – 2025 (total)

Total																
Year	Hours	No. of companies	Fatalities	FAR	LTIs	LTIFR	TRIs	TRIR	SOs	SOR	LTIs Falls	LTIs Slips	LTIs Drops	LTIs Muscular	LTIs Line of fire	LTIs Energy
2005	158,552,118	50	5	3.15	188	1.22	861	5.43	142792	180.12	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	212,450,971	72	6	2.82	225	1.09	913	4.30	171207	161.17	-	-	-	-	-	-
2007	309,594,048	100	6	1.94	339	1.11	1356	4.38	236749	152.94	-	-	-	-	-	-
2008	612,490,479	129	7	1.14	433	0.72	1530	2.50	662737	216.41	-	-	-	-	-	-
2009	601,527,826	152	6	1.00	395	0.67	1530	2.54	628524	208.98	-	-	-	-	-	-
2010	546,645,713	172	7	1.28	393	0.73	1499	2.74	694316	254.03	41	86	104	26	77	85
2011	582,747,578	195	3	0.51	370	0.64	1400	2.40	766529	263.07	31	90	79	44	46	124
2012	887,591,009	227	16	1.80	467	0.54	1825	2.06	1076877	242.65	45	115	101	26	76	130
2013	900,507,029	245	9	1.00	474	0.54	1908	2.12	1304144	289.65	46	96	111	25	78	143
2014	797,693,620	264	6	0.75	424	0.54	1736	2.18	1290748	323.62	33	88	110	30	71	122
2015	720,028,341	251	16	2.22	352	0.51	1561	2.17	1204096	334.46	23	81	73	25	58	117
2016	622,142,626	211	6	0.96	264	0.43	1121	1.80	1012822	325.59	21	64	25	5	25	124
2017	581,053,260	192	5	0.86	227	0.40	934	1.61	973416	335.05	29	56	27	19	15	100
2018	708,183,896	177	5	0.71	269	0.39	921	1.30	1243559	351.20	21	62	13	27	116	30
2019	745,829,268	144	22	2.95	245	0.36	892	1.20	1369817	367.33	13	57	13	30	110	22
2020	662,553,442	144	2	0.30	209	0.32	730	1.10	1354538	408.88	19	52	16	20	87	15
2021	560,239,166	134	16	2.86	179	0.35	762	1.36	1151242	410.98	12	45	6	16	94	6
2022	636,330,231	138	6	0.94	199	0.32	705	1.11	1360901	427.73	15	51	10	25	85	13
2023	958,160,632	182	6	0.63	280	0.30	1022	1.07	2110612	440.55	23	69	9	37	116	13
2024	1,015,506,567	198	3	0.30	302	0.30	1121	1.10	2447870	482.10	24	66	9	28	155	19
2025	1,020,036,687	167	7	0.69	268	0.27	996	0.98	1974099	387.06	13	91	15	26	109	12


B. IMCA safety data 2005 – 2025 (offshore)

Offshore															
Year	Hours	Fatalities	FAR	LTIs	LTIFR	TRIs	TRIR	SOs	SOR	LTIs Falls	LTIs Slips	LTIs Drops	LTIs Muscu-lar	LTIs Line of fire	LTIs Energy
2005	100,895,445	4	3.96	171	1.73	740	7.33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	177,565,693	6	3.38	195	1.13	806	4.54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2007	251,905,187	6	2.38	315	1.27	1180	4.68	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2008	464,839,207	5	1.08	341	0.74	1176	2.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2009	474,150,211	6	1.27	340	0.73	1291	2.72	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2010	389,055,171	5	1.29	328	0.86	1240	3.19	-	-	36	71	80	26	67	74
2011	430,652,379	3	0.70	303	0.71	1133	2.63	-	-	29	72	60	38	37	105
2012	597,010,716	14	2.35	357	0.62	1274	2.13	-	-	34	95	76	22	48	104
2013	607,853,750	7	1.15	341	0.57	1378	2.27	-	-	27	68	91	15	59	96
2014	558,244,657	4	0.72	358	0.65	1453	2.60	-	-	28	82	89	26	55	104
2015	483,242,667	16	3.31	280	0.61	1215	2.51	-	-	19	65	53	21	45	98
2016	393,885,528	4	1.02	204	0.53	904	2.30	-	-	13	52	18	176	22	265
2017	403,483,938	5	1.24	183	0.47	757	1.88	62,132	31	28	45	22	5	13	75
2018	392,394,191	2	0.51	188	0.48	626	1.60	922,078	470	12	42	8	19	78	29
2019	379,304,772	16	4.22	184	0.53	638	1.68	869,496	458	9	42	9	21	83	20
2020	309,206,556	1	0.32	156	0.51	530	1.71	1,117,418	723	15	42	13	14	58	14
2021	292,641,573	16	5.47	127	0.49	582	1.99	991,523	678	5	34	4	14	66	4
2022	347,112,628	4	1.15	132	0.39	504	1.45	1,133,001	653	13	33	7	10	58	11
2023	490,401,208	2	0.41	197	0.41	720	1.47	1,422,497	580	13	53	6	26	88	10
2024	548,403,377	1	0.18	189	0.35	758	1.38	1,958,997	714	11	45	6	19	93	10
2025	524,483,938	4	0.76	155	0.30	598	1.14	1,318,307	503	7	55	9	12	65	6


C. Total LTIFR and TRIR by company band

	Band A		Band B		Band C		Band D		IMCA Total	
Year	LTIFR	TRIR	LTIFR	TRIR	LTIFR	TRIR	LTIFR	TRIR	LTIFR	TRIR
2025	0.19	0.76	0.34	1.36	0.55	1.69	0.88	2.32	0.27	0.98
2024	0.22	0.91	0.31	1.27	0.59	1.66	0.80	2.15	0.30	1.10
2023	0.21	0.83	0.40	1.34	0.56	1.64	0.97	3.15	0.30	1.07
2022	0.26	0.90	0.39	1.50	0.46	1.57	0.95	2.39	0.32	1.10
2021	0.28	0.99	0.33	1.68	0.59	2.08	0.6	2.74	0.35	1.35
2020	0.24	0.87	0.31	1.25	0.55	1.62	0.96	2.96	0.31	1.09
2019	0.23	0.84	0.50	1.96	0.68	1.89	0.92	3.04	0.33	1.11
2018	0.27	0.90	0.53	1.60	0.58	2.16	0.99	3.16	0.39	1.70
2017	0.22	0.95	0.45	2.01	0.62	2.39	1.21	4.38	0.42	1.67
2016	0.26	1.07	0.55	2.29	0.62	2.45	0.94	5.34	0.43	1.82
2015	0.29	1.16	0.59	2.49	0.56	2.82	1.79	7.17	0.49	2.15
2014	0.29	1.31	0.54	1.86	0.81	2.93	1.63	7.33	0.54	2.18
2013	0.19	0.79	0.62	2.47	0.75	3.03	2.13	6.76	0.54	2.12
2012	0.30	1.35	0.37	1.92	0.99	3.06	2.36	6.72	0.51	1.93
2011	0.27	1.29	0.58	2.24	1.10	3.58	2.01	7.37	0.64	2.40
2010	0.44	1.88	0.84	2.60	1.02	3.62	2.18	8.07	0.73	2.74
2009	0.40	1.78	0.64	2.58	1.41	4.66	1.74	5.90	0.67	2.54
2008	0.43	1.70	1.14	3.81	1.18	3.78	2.41	7.93	0.72	2.50
2007	0.78	2.82	1.24	4.57	1.44	6.07	1.64	9.20	1.09	4.38

Graph 10. TRIR per company band



Graph 11. LTIFR per company band



D. Participating companies in 2025

Abu Dhabi Marine Operations and Services Company LLC	Film-Ocean Limited
Acteon Group Operations (UK) Limited	Floatel International AB
Aesen Pte. Ltd.	Fred. Olsen Windcarrier ASA
Africa Diving Services (ADS) Ltd	FSDS LLP
Alam Maritim (M) Sdn Bhd	Fugro
Allseas Group SA	GEOxyz BVBA
American Marine Corporation	Global Marine Systems Ltd
Andrews Hydrographics Ltd	Glomar Offshore Windsupport BV
Aqua Omega Services Pvt Ltd	GO Offshore PTY Ltd
Aquatec Marine Services Ltd	Greatship (India) Ltd
Aqueos Corporation	Gulf Dredging & General Contracting Company
Archirodon Construction (Overseas) Company Limited	KSC (Closed)
Argo Marine Ltd	Gulf Marine Services WLL
Asso.subsea Single Member S.A.	Halul Offshore Service Co. W.L.L.
Astro Middle East Ship Management DMCC	Havila Shipping ASA
Atlantic Maritime Group FZE	Havila Subsea Management AS
Atlantic Towing Ltd	Heerema Marine Contractors
Aurora Offshore Management AS	Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc.
Baltic Taucherei- Und Bergungsbetrieb Rostock GmbH	Horizon Maritime Services Ltd.
Beacon Offshore Ltd	Hornbeck Offshore Operators LLC
Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement (Cyprus) Limited	Hull Support Services Ltd
BESIX Construct LLC	Hurricane Geo Inspection Survey Sdn Bhd
Bibby Marine Management Ltd	HydroDive Nigeria Ltd
Boskalis Offshore	IGOPL Offshore Pvt. Ltd
Cadeler A/S	IKM Subsea Singapore Pte Ltd
Canship Ugland Ltd	International Marine Works - Alexandria
Caspian Marine Services B.V.	International Naval Works - Abu Dhabi
Caspian Offshore Construction LLP	IWS Fleet AS
CNS International srl	Jan De Nul nv
Consolidated Contractors Company (Underwater Engineering) SAL	JFE Engineering Corporation
Constructora Subacuatica Diavaz SA de CV	Jumbo Offshore Installation Contractors BV
CSBC-DEME Wind Engineering Co. Ltd.	K Subsea Brunei Limited
Cyan Offshore Pty Ltd	KD Marine Ltd
DCN Diving BV	Khalid Faraj Shipping
DeepOcean AS	KNOT Management AS
Deepsee Sdn Bhd	Kotug International BV
DEME Offshore (member of DEME Group)	Mabisel Trading & Construction Company Limited
DOF Group ASA	Maran Shuttle Tankers Norway AS
Dong Fang Offshore Co., Ltd.	Massterly
DP World Maritime Solutions FZE	McDermott International Inc.
Drafinsub Srl	Mermaid Subsea Services (Thailand) Ltd
Dragon Geosciences Co., Ltd	Mohn Drilling AS
DWTEK Co Ltd.	NDE Offshore Oil and Gas Services LLC
EDT Shipmanagement Ltd	New Zealand Diving and Salvage Ltd
EGS (Asia) Ltd	Next Geosolutions Europe SPA
Eidesvik AS	NMDC Group PJSC
ESVAGT AS	North Star DB Holdings Limited
Fairplay Schleppdampfschiffs-Reederei Richard Borchard GmbH	Nortrans Offshore II Pte Ltd
	Ocean Installer AS
	Ocean Works Asia, Inc.
	Oceaneering International
	OceanLift Subsea Ghana Ltd
	OCTOMAR, Serviços Marítimos, Ltd
	OEG Subsea

D. Participating companies in 2025

Operatec - Engenharia & Servicos, Limitada
Optic Marine Singapore Pte Ltd
OSC Marine Group Ltd
OWL Heavy Lift B.V.
Petrovietnam College
POSH Subsea Pte Ltd
PT Advanced Offshore Services
PT Atlantis Subsea Indonesia Tbk
PT Bintang Subsea Indonesia
PT Seascope Surveys Indonesia
PT Wintermar Offshore Marine Tbk
Purus Wind Ltd
Rana Subsea S.p.A.
Rawabi Vallianz Offshore Services Co Ltd
Reach Subsea AS
Rem Maritime AS
RockSalt Subsea Ltd
RollDock Shipping BV
ROVOP Limited
S. B. Submarine Systems Co., Ltd.
S.C. Nemo Pro Diving S.R.L.
Saipem
SBM Offshore NV
Sea1 Offshore Inc.
Seacor Marine International BV
SeaPro Petroleum and Marine Services S.A.E
Seatek Energy and Marine Services LLC
Shanghai Salvage Company
Shelf Subsea
Six Alliance Co. Ltd
SOCAR, Azneft PU, Diving Service
SOCAR-Dalgidj LLC
Solstad Shipping AS
Stanford Marine LLC, Dubai
Stapem Offshore SA
Subsea7
SubseaPartner AS
Supreme Hydro Engineering Pvt Ltd
Ta San Shang Marine Co., Ltd.
Tan Cang Offshore JSC
TechnipFMC
Telford Offshore FZE
Thang Nhat Subsea Services JSC
Tidewater Inc.
Total Marine Technology Pty Ltd
Transocean Inc.
Travaux Sous Marins Camerounais (TSMC) SARL
Trone Sdn Bhd
TS Shipping OÜ
Tsakos Shipping & Trading SA
Unidive Offshore Pte Ltd
United Offshore Support GmbH
Valaris Plc
Van Oord Support Services B.V.
Vantage Driller III Co. (Dubai)
Vantris Energy Berhad

Viridian Maritime Pte. Ltd.
Vroon Offshore Services Ltd
Wagenborg Offshore Holding BV
West African Ventures Ltd
Wilhelmsen Ship Management (Norway) AS
Wilson Sons Offshore SA
Yoshida-Gumi Co.Ltd
Zakher Marine International Inc.
Zamil Offshore Services Company
Zeaquest Co., Ltd.



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