

DP Station Keeping Event Reporting Form

IMCA DP station keeping event reporting is secure and confidential. The reports are used to provide anonymous information to the DP industry so as to improve the overall safety of DP operations. See www.imca-int.com/dp-events for more details.

This report should be completed on the following occasions:

- DP incident a major system failure, environmental or human factor which has resulted in a loss of DP capability
- DP undesired event a system failure, environmental or human factor which has caused a loss of redundancy and/or compromised DP capability
- **DP observation** an event that has not resulted in a loss of redundancy or compromised DP operational capability, but is still deemed worthy of sharing

Please submit your completed form (and supporting documents) to your vessel operating company.

IMCA members and non-member companies should forward reports to IMCA so that information can be anonymously shared with industry by emailing **incidentreports@imca-int.com**

Document details and issue record

This section is treated by IMCA as highly confidential

| Vessel | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Location | |
| Client | |
| Date of event | |
| Reported by | |
| Rank/rating | |
| Report status (initial/final) | |

1 Operation

| Operation type | |
|------------------------|--|
| DP event type * | |
| IMO DP equipment class | |
| Region | |

* Example events

DP incident:

- A thruster fails incorrectly and acts as an undesirable force on the vessel, resulting in the loss of station keeping
- The DP network has failed with errors and all control is lost; the main DP system has lost position keeping capability
- Incorrect setup of an auxiliary system causes transfer of a fault on both redundancy groups
- A blackout leads to loss of position

DP undesired event:

- Failure of a DP controller causing a loss in redundancy in the main DP system
- A position reference has a valid signal input with interference and is not rejected
- A partial blackout, vessel holds position but has no redundancy

DP observation:

- Failure of a thruster which does not result in a loss of redundancy
- Circuit breakers in a distribution panel are incorrectly labelled
- An incorrect alarm description appears on the DP system causing momentary confusion

2 Environment

| Initial heading set point (deg) | Water depth (m) | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Significant wave height (m) | Visibility | |

| Wind speed (kts) | | Direct from (deg) | |
|---------------------|---|--------------------|--|
| | | | |
| Current speed (kts) | | Direction to (deg) | |
| DP or real current? | | | |
| | • | | |

| Swell height (m) | Direction to (deg) | |
|---------------------|--------------------|--|
| Swell period (secs) | | |

3 Equipment status

| | DP | PMS |
|----------------------|----|-----|
| Control system state | | |
| Manufacturer | | |

| Bus-tie(s) status | | Number of redundant groups | |
|-------------------|--|----------------------------|--|
|-------------------|--|----------------------------|--|

| | Total fitted | Running, selected to DP | Available not selected |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Thrusters (inc. main props) | | | |
| Generators | | | |

| Position reference systems | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------|----------------|------------------------|
| Туре | Total fitted | Selected to DP | Available not selected |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

| Sensors | | | |
|---------|--------------|----------------|------------------------|
| Туре | Total fitted | Selected to DP | Available not selected |
| Gyro | | | |
| MRS/VRS | | | |
| Wind | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

4 Sketch

Show vessel outline, environment, heading, location of position references and underwater assets

Sketch attached

5 Sequence of events

Include detailed summary and timeline starting from operations prior to event and concluding once a point of safety is reached The purpose is to provide an opportunity to learn and this can be greatly enhanced if you can include times of significant events.

6 Numerical description

| Distance of uncontrolled movement | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Duration of event | |
| Time to regain control of the vessel | |
| Maximum riser angle (Drilling) in deg | |
| Disconnect distance (Drilling) | |

7 Event findings and corrective actions

| What first alerted the participants to a potential or actual problem | | |
|--|--|---|
| | Cause category | Additional information |
| Main cause * | | |
| Secondary cause | | |
| * It is important to understand the definition | n of 'main cause' and 'sec | ondary cause'. This example will assist the understanding: |
| A DP equipment Class 2 vessel is configured One thruster stops. The root cause was four | with four thrusters, bus t id to be a power module | ie open with one stern and one bow thruster on each bus. failure on the thruster frequency drive. |
| Given this example, the IMCA reporting sche lost. The reason the thruster stopped was a | eme would record the ma power module failure, an | in cause as 'thruster failure', because that was why redundancy was d so the secondary cause, would be 'electrical'. |
| Potential causal or contributory fa | ctors | |
| Human factors that were ident | ified as causal or cor | tributory to the event |
| Has there been a need to modify the | content of drills or exerci | ses related to DP operations? |
| Has there been any causal or contribu | itory factors identified rel | ated to training, familiarisation and competency? |
| | | |
| Did communication issues play a part instructions given, etc.)? | in the event (change of s | hift/mode control from different locations/understanding of |
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| Did communication issues play a part instructions given, etc.)? Processes and procedures that | in the event (change of s | hift/mode control from different locations/understanding of |
| Did communication issues play a part instructions given, etc.)? Processes and procedures that Was there any requirement to modify FMEA/proving or annual trials/field er | in the event (change of s were identified as ca DP specific documentati ntry checklists or trials) | hift/mode control from different locations/understanding of |
| Did communication issues play a part instructions given, etc.)? Processes and procedures that Was there any requirement to modify FMEA/proving or annual trials/field er Was the critical or task appropriate m | in the event (change of s were identified as ca DP specific documentati try checklists or trials) ode of operation appropr | hift/mode control from different locations/understanding of ausal or contributory to the event on as a result of the event? (DP ops manual/checklists/ASOG/WSOG riate or considered? |

• Equipment and design that were identified as causal or contributory to the event

Did any hidden failures or cross connections manifest themselves?

Were there any issues with independence or segregation of otherwise redundant components or systems?

Did protective devices and systems not operate as designed or specified?

Were there and issues with incorrect or lack of alarms?

Was there any need to modify or add any maintenance regimes?

Were there any requirements to modify or update software for any systems?

| Actions taken (select Yes/No from menu) | | |
|--|--|--|
| Reported to shore management | | |
| Repair required | | |
| Software modification required | | |
| Report submitted to supplier | | |
| Procedures modified | | |
| Standing instructions, such as activity- or well-specific operating guidelines (ASOG/WSOG), modified | | |
| Additional training conducted | | |
| Additional alarm installed | | |
| Warning label or sign fitted | | |
| Has the event been closed out with a satisfactory conclusion? | | |
| Have lessons learnt been shared internally? | | |
| Have lessons learnt been shared externally? | | |

8 Comments

Additional actions taken and details not fully covered in the report

9 Attachments

Tick if included

| Activity-specific operating guidelines (ASOG)/well specific operating guidelines (WSOG) | | |
|---|--|--|
| Damage report | | |
| DP event investigation report | | |
| DP history station printout | | |
| DP screen dump | | |
| Sketch | | |
| DP system alarm printout | | |
| Failure report | | |
| Malfunction report | | |
| Power management system (PMS) alarm printout | | |
| Supplier service report | | |
| Weather forecast | | |
| Other 1 (name): | | |
| Other 2 (name): | | |
| Other 3 (name): | | |

(Further changes to the form will not be allowed)

| Name | |
|-----------|--|
| Signature | |
| Date | |