Crushed finger injury during wire transfer operations

Able seamen were assisting with overboarding an ROV hook (connected to the lower drum tow wire) over the stern of the vessel until it could run freely on the winch. The socket and ROV hook were already over the stern but the wire needed assistance to run freely. The tow wire was dragged down the deck with the capstan by using a stopper chain double-choked around it. When the wire started running freely over the stern it was all stop on both the capstan and the winch (tow wire).

The crew then used a crowbar to try and free the stopper chain from the wire. This was done by inserting the crowbar underneath the wire to lift it up from the deck. One of the AB’s was removing the stopper chain whilst the crow bar held it up. Unfortunately, the crowbar was removed too early resulting in the wire falling to the deck whilst his hand was still underneath it. This resulted in a crush injury to the left index finger.

The job was immediately stopped and the injured person was taken into the vessel hospital to be assessed by the medical team offshore in communication with the onshore medical advisory service.

The vessel sailed into port for assessment of the finger injury at the hospital.

Our members’ investigation revealed the following:

• The size of the chain stopper wrapped twice around the tow wire made access difficult for removal without placing a hand underneath the wire.
• The tow wire was heavy and difficult to move.
• There was no alternative means available to move the tow wire.
• Complacency – “task seen as routine”:
  • It was not foreseen that the tow wire would move.
  • This was a routine activity completed many times before.
  • This method was viewed as “standard practice”.
• The risk assessment was not reviewed:
  • It did not identify that there should be verification of ‘hands clear’ before the crowbar was removed.
  • There was “normalisation” of the perception of risk of finger entrapment not identified.
  • A failsafe for the tow wire slipping was not identified.
• Stop Work Authority was not discussed nor seen as part of dynamic risk assessment;
• There was poor situational awareness of the line of fire hazard.