Complete the job

  • DP Event
  • Published on 16 January 2025
  • Generated on 8 May 2025
  • DPE 01/25
  • 3 minute read

Undesired event

1 Overview 

The DP equipment class 2 vessel was operating within a windfarm safety zone, with all thrusters operational, three of the six diesel generators running and the bus-tie breakers closed. At the time the vessel was in operating in close proximity to wind turbines and was engaged in gangway operations. The environmental conditions were fair at the time of the incident, with 1m wave, 10kts wind and 1.5kts real current. 

2 What happened? 

Whilst connected to a turbine, an alarm was generated on the DP operator station, ‘Unbalanced load on SWBD 1’. The DPO informed the Gangway Operator to immediately stop all transfers over the gangway, whilst the investigation was carried out. 

In the engine room, diesel generator 3 had tripped. The minimum number of generators was set to three, therefore the next standby generator automatically started and synchronised within 50 seconds, restoring generating capacity to switchboard 1. 

Following communication from the duty engineer confirming the reason for the tripped engine, and the restoration to minimum number of allowable generators within the safety zone, as prescribed by the Master’s Orders, the DPO gave the green light for gangway transfer operations to resume. 

3 Findings

On investigation, the following was found: 

  • The high difference pressure alarm activated on DG3 fuel filter.
  • The duty engineer had been made aware when the vessel entered the safety zone.
  • The duty engineer chose to changeover to the standby fuel filter, whilst still connected to the switchboard. 
  • The offline fuel filter had not been bled following the last filter cleaning.
  • No loss of thrusters due to the vessel operating in Closed Bus.
  • The lessons learnt were shared internally within the company.

4 Conclusion 

A similar event has occurred previously on a fleet vessel. Though not identical scenarios, the loss of a diesel generator occurred on a sister vessel after its fuel filter was also not correctly bled of air following maintenance. 

These events occurred only one month apart on two vessels within the same fleet. The first event was reported to shore management and the lessons learnt shared internally within the company, so how and why did it repeat the following month on a sister vessel? 

The act of changing/cleaning filters is a task which comes up regularly within every vessels preventative maintenance system, so could it be that this is a highly common event occurring worldwide? It highlights the importance of preventive maintenance, not only that it is carried out in due time, but that even errors occur on seemingly easy tasks. It reiterates the importance of not carrying out maintenance on ‘on-line’ equipment when operating within the safety zones. 


The case studies and observations above have been compiled from information received by IMCA. All vessel, client, and operational data has been removed from the narrative to ensure anonymity. Case studies are not intended as guidance on the safe conduct of operations, but rather to assist vessel managers, DP operators, and technical crew.

IMCA makes every effort to ensure both the accuracy and reliability of the information, but it is not liable for any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.

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