Lack of operational planning leads to DP incident
- DP Event
- Published on 28 September 2020
- Generated on 5 November 2026
- DPE 03/20
- 2 minute read
Incident
Jump to:
The loss of both DGNSS were due to huge superstructure of the installation interfering with satellite signals.
Comments
It was concluded that the loss of both DGNSS were due to huge superstructure of the installation interfering with satellite signals. This phenomenon is called reflection meaning DGNSS picks up reflected signals from the surroundings.
Considerations
- The vessel was not being operated as a DP Equipment Class 2, as the requirement is at least three independent position reference systems should be installed and simultaneously available to the DP control system. Reference Guidance on Position Reference Systems and Sensors for DP Vessels (IMCA M252).
- Loss of more than one DGNSS position reference system is a well-known issue due to external common cause failures, for example shielding of reference satellites and/or differential corrections.
- Operational planning and decision support tools, such as Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG), were clearly not in use or were inadequate. Reference Guidance on Operational Activity Planning (IMCA M220).
- It appears that the DP Alert system was not used.
- It is mentioned in the report that at 08:09, master takes control of the vessel by the IJS. It is unclear from the report why the vessel then made contact with the installation. Reference: The Training and experience of Key DP personnel (IMCA M117).
- .This event clearly demonstrates the benefit that can be gained from regular DP exercises and drills.
Latest DP incidents
-
Watch what you are pressing
While transiting away from a wind farm, the Master of a DP equipment class 2 vessel observed that the vessel was operating in Backup Mode and queried this with the bridge team and attending electrician
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
The domino effect
The event demonstrates the importance of maintaining the approved DP power configuration, addressing known defects before equipment is relied upon during DP operations, and ensuring DP personnel understand how changes to the generating arrangement can affect redundancy and failure propagation
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
Lost in calibration
During activity associated with calibration of a vessel Vertical Reference Unit (VRU), the DP control system experienced degradation of its attitude reference arrangement. Shortly afterwards, the vessel generated an Off Position Warning followed by an Off Position Alarm
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
The UPS and downs
While a vessel was transiting in DP mode, the DPO observed the loss of Gyros 2 and 3 together with alarms from a 230V backup power supply. The telephone system remained powered but was inoperable.
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
DP drill scenario – Consequence Analysis Class DP2 & DP3
DP drill scenario – Consequence Analysis Class DP2 & DP3
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Drill Scenario
The case studies and observations above have been compiled from information received by IMCA. All vessel, client, and operational data has been removed from the narrative to ensure anonymity. Case studies are not intended as guidance on the safe conduct of operations, but rather to assist vessel managers, DP operators, and technical crew.
IMCA makes every effort to ensure both the accuracy and reliability of the information, but it is not liable for any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.
Any queries should be directed to DP team at IMCA. Share your DP incidents with IMCA online. Sign-up to receive DP event bulletins straight to your email.