Both DP operating stations stopped communication
- DP Event
- Published on 10 August 2017
- Generated on 4 November 2026
- DPE 03/17
- 2 minute read
Incident
Jump to:
The report suggests the possibility that the vessel returned to operations without sufficient testing to find the root cause of the problem.
Comments
- It is possible that as the vessel was only recently set up on DP, field arrival trials had not yet been completed.
- The use of DGNSS as the only position reference system for DP equipment class 2 operations is not good practice, however it is recognised that deployment of the CTD beacon could be in preparation for initiating a DP acoustic system.
- It is not clear, from the information provided, of the exact sequence of events: sensors and position reference systems are hard wired to the DP controller or Fieldnet connections, located in the DP controller cabinet, they are not connected directly to the DP OS and therefore position keeping capability should not have been affected by the OS not communicating.
- One possibility is that it was the DP controllers that stopped communicating and caused the problem; if this was the case the question should have been asked how this single point failure could have happened.
- The vessel would probably be controlled better using the independent joystick rather than individual manual control of the thrusters.
- The report suggests the possibility that the vessel returned to operations without sufficient testing to find the root cause of the problem.
Latest DP incidents
-
Watch what you are pressing
While transiting away from a wind farm, the Master of a DP equipment class 2 vessel observed that the vessel was operating in Backup Mode and queried this with the bridge team and attending electrician
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
The domino effect
The event demonstrates the importance of maintaining the approved DP power configuration, addressing known defects before equipment is relied upon during DP operations, and ensuring DP personnel understand how changes to the generating arrangement can affect redundancy and failure propagation
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
Lost in calibration
During activity associated with calibration of a vessel Vertical Reference Unit (VRU), the DP control system experienced degradation of its attitude reference arrangement. Shortly afterwards, the vessel generated an Off Position Warning followed by an Off Position Alarm
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
The UPS and downs
While a vessel was transiting in DP mode, the DPO observed the loss of Gyros 2 and 3 together with alarms from a 230V backup power supply. The telephone system remained powered but was inoperable.
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Incident
-
DP drill scenario – Consequence Analysis Class DP2 & DP3
DP drill scenario – Consequence Analysis Class DP2 & DP3
DPE 03/26
19 October 2026
Drill Scenario
The case studies and observations above have been compiled from information received by IMCA. All vessel, client, and operational data has been removed from the narrative to ensure anonymity. Case studies are not intended as guidance on the safe conduct of operations, but rather to assist vessel managers, DP operators, and technical crew.
IMCA makes every effort to ensure both the accuracy and reliability of the information, but it is not liable for any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.
Any queries should be directed to DP team at IMCA. Share your DP incidents with IMCA online. Sign-up to receive DP event bulletins straight to your email.